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1. Two different sorts of criticism of religion

Broadly speaking, the criticism of religion can be classified into two groups, a priori and a posteriori sorts of criticisms. To the first group belong attempts to re-interpret religious claims in line with whatever world view the critic presupposes. To this group belong the Feuerbachian/Marxian line of criticism, the (later) sociological theories of religion (e.g. Durkheim’s), Freud’s etc. Those attempts are a priori in that they rule out the possibility of religion from the beginning on. Given e.g. the materialist world view, that Marx, and, to some extent Freud and even Feuerbach​[1]​ presuppose, religious claims are ruled out on a priori grounds. This sort of criticism has its roots in the classical Continental philosophical tradition with its openness towards grand metaphysical theories, such as materialism and whatever theories are built upon it (e.g. a materialist theory of history). Its weakness is, obviously, that its critique of religion makes sense only to those people already sharing whatever world view is at stake. 
A posteriori criticisms of religion are, at least, prima facie open towards the possibility of religion. To this group belong, among others, the logical positivist criticism of religion, the critical rationalist one and the evidentialist one. Members of this group do not foreclose the possibility of religion from the outset in that they do not presuppose a world view which rules out religion from the beginning on. Rather, they first stipulate a certain methodological ideal and then judge that (certain types of) religion cannot conform to this ideal. 
Logical positivism stipulates the ‘verification as meaning’ ideal and then judges that religious claims are not verifiable, thus, meaningless​[2]​. Critical rationalism suggests the ideal that all scientific theories should be falsifiable and that certain religious claims, e.g. existentialist-Christian ones, are deliberately exempted from the possibility of falsification, thus are ‘unscientific’ (‘unwissenschaftlich’)​[3]​. Evidentialism suggests the ideal that one should only believe in claims for which one has sufficient evidence and then judges that there is not sufficient evidence for religion, thus, that one should not believe in it (see below). 
A posteriori criticisms of religion imply less strenuous presuppositions than a priori ones. They do not presuppose a particular world view but, rather, only a particular methodology. They are rooted in the Anglo-American tradition with its emphasis upon methodological concerns and its scepticism with regard to grand metaphysical schemes. Being less biased with regard to world views, they are less presumptious, thus have more potential followers. Therefore, in a certain sense, they are more serious challenges to religion than a priori criticisms are. Hence, people being interested in the apology of religion should seriously engage with those a posteriori criticisms. 
Elsewhere, I have criticized the logical positivist and the critical rationalist criticism of religion. On closer scrutiny, it turns out that logical positivism presupposes more than a purely methodological ideal in that it does not simply rely on the ideal of verification but specifies verification in empiricist terms. Thus, it is not neutral with regard to world views and, as such, loses the advantage that is characteristic for a posteriori criticisms. And, contray to its appearance, even critical rationalism presupposes more than a methodological ideal. The alleged incompatibility between the quest for truth and the quest for certainty, the rationale behind the ideal of falsification, excludes certain world views on a priori grounds, such as claims to revelation as ‘Erschließungsoffenbarungen’.​[4]​ Thus, it is not neutral with regard to world views.   
	In this article, I would like to focus on the evidentialist critique of religion and, above all, on its rejection. In the remainder of this chapter, I will flesh out what its critique of religion consists of and in chapter 4 I will sum up the arguments against it. In chapters 2-3, I will concentrate on William James’ argument against it which I consider to be one of the most forceful rejections of evidentialism.
	
2. The evidentialist critique of religion

The evidentialist believes in the methodological ideal that one should remain sceptical of a claim until one has sufficient evidence to believe in it. As a philosophical ideal, it is particularly prominent in the Anglo-American world with its appreciation of regimented methodological approaches. In the history of philosophy, Locke and Hume are prominent proponents of evidentialism​[5]​. And Bertrand Russell defends a similar position with his ‘true precept of veracity’ that goes as follows: ‘We ought to give to every proposition which we consider as nearly as possible that degree of credence which is warranted by the probability it acquires from the evidence known to us’​[6]​.
Evidentialism is commonly used to criticize religion and its claims​[7]​. It is assumed that there is not enough evidence available to support religion and that, therefore, religious claims are unacceptable. For example, W.K. Clifford argues that there is simply not enough evidence for believing in religion and that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’​[8]​. And Bertrand Russell answered the question what he would say if, after death, he would be brought into the presence of God with the following words: ‘Not enough evidence God! Not enough evidence!’​[9]​
As a general cultural phenomenon, evidentialism is widespread in the Anglo-American and the Continental world. It is implied in remarks such as the following: ‘Look, I am not at all opposed to religion as such. But it cannot be proven (or: the truth of particular religous claims, such as that of the resurrection of Christ), cannot be proven. Therefore, it would be dishonest to believe in it/them’. The evidentialist thus claims the ‘moral high grounds’ concerning the ethics of belief-acquisition (not only religious belief but belief in general) and rejects religion on those grounds. 
Given that the evidentialist critique of religion is widespread in the general cultural sphere as well as in (Anglo-American) philosophy, it is not surprising that philosophers of religion and theologians have taken great pains to refute it. Basically, there are two different strategies available to reject the evidentialist critique of religion. You can either accept the evidentialist ideal but reject the charge that (certain) religious claims fail to meet it. On the Anglo-American side, Richard Swinburne attempts to do that by demonstrating the probability of religion via reconstructing the traditional proofs as cumulative arguments for the existence of God, on the Continental side, Wolfhart Pannenberg attempts to do that by demonstrating the likelihood of the resurrection of Christ​[10]​.
Or, you can attack the evidentialist ideal and its application with regard to religion. Prominent proponents of that strategy are the Reformed Epistemologists. For example, Plantinga is famous for rejecting the evidentialist challenge by arguing that religious claims do not need to be evidentially supported by non-religious beliefs​[11]​. 
William James is another anti-evidentialist. However, he does currently not receive as much attention as Plantinga does in theological circles. And in philosophical circles, he does receive attention - but for the wrong reasons. In the following, I would like to remove a common misunderstanding of his famous critique of evidentialism. My contention is that this argument, properly reconstructed, is a valuable tool against evidentialism. As will be indicated below (see IV.4), it has possibly consequences that go beyond the refutation of evidentialism in that it harbors the potential to undermine the 19th century criticism of religion (Feuerbach’s and Freud’s). In any case, it is worth scrutinizing seriously and people interested in the apology of religion cannot afford to neglect it. Thus, I will go at some length to analyze it (in chapters 2 and 3).  


II The argument of ‘The Will to Believe’

1. The Point of James’ Argument

James’ defence of religion in ‘The Will to Believe’​[12]​ is among the most ferociously attacked arguments there are. James is charged with promoting intellectual laziness, wishful thinking and the like. Not only notorious critics of religion, such as Russell, are highly critical of James but also people being generally sympathetic to religion, such as John Hick​[13]​. 
The reasons for the ferociousness of that critique are manyfold. Among others, James’ provocative style in TWTB contributes to it​[14]​. But what fuels the resentments most is probably the assumption that James tries to provide an argument to the effect that the will can make religious claims true. His critics take James to argue that we can use the will or passion to make us believe that religious claims are true, whereas truth is understood more or less along the lines of a classical correspondence theory of truth. 
Such an interpretation suggests itself if you believe that James proposes a theory of truth according to which truth is ‘expediency of belief’, ‘what is good in the way of belief’ or something of that sort. There has been an abundance of literature on the question what sort of a truth theory James proposes​[15]​ and I do not have the space to take up the issue here. Let me restrict my comments here to saying that, apart from the question as to whether James’ remarks about truth as ‘utility’ or ‘expediency’ are indeed meant to provide a full-fledged theory of truth​[16]​, his argument in TWTB can be read independently of such an identification of truth with utility or something of that sort. As we will see, it is more plausible without it and so are the apologetic benefits to be reaped from it. 
The object of the following reconstruction of James is thus to show that he does not target truth-theory proper in TWTB but questions of entitlement or decision-theory. He does not argue bluntly that we can will religious beliefs to be true but, rather, that, in the absence of convincing evidence to the effect that religion is true or false, we are entitled to make a decision in favor of religion with the help of the will (provided certain provisions are met). Such an argument I take to be an interesting apologetic tool - particularly so for those philosophers of religion or theologians who engange in a dialogue with secular philosophers. 

2. The function of the ‘logical intellect’ 

In TWTB, James wants to provide ‘a defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced’​[17]​. Here, James criticizes the universal pretensions of people arguing that the ‘logical intellect’ is the only true judge in religious and related matters. Against them, James contends that it can be legitimate to invoke ‘non-intellectual’ resources, such as will or passion, when it comes to judging religious belief. 
What is the point of introducing the notion of ‘intellectualism’ at this point? James does not explicitly answer this question and our reconstruction of his intentions should thus go beyond what he explicitly says. I think that the introduction of intellectualism cannot be accounted for if we do not assume that it is linked with evidentialism. Put more straightforwardly, James regards the evidentialist to be an intellectualist. According to James, when the evidentialist insists on the provision of evidence, he has only intellectual evidence in mind. For the evidentialist, there is no such thing as non-intellectual evidence. The use of will, passion, and the like is excluded on a priori grounds.
But what if the intellectual evidence for and against a given case is equal, asks James. In some cases, we can leave it at that and walk away from the issue. But in other cases, this is impossible. And religious belief is among those cases. What is at stake in the decision to believe or unbelieve is of such importance that remaining neutral is out of the question. The evidentialist suggesting that if there is insufficient evidence for religious belief we should simply walk away from it, has no right to occupy the ‘high-grounds’ regarding belief-acquisition. His suggestion is not based upon purely intellectual, ‘rational’, considerations but upon a sort of passion as well, viz. upon the fear of being mistaken. Thus, the person invoking passion to the effect of hoping that religious belief is true is no worse off than the evidentialist sceptic. 




Crucial for the following reconstruction is James’ use of the notion of a ‘genuine option’. Its use will make clear that James’ contribution is directed towards solving problems of entitlement or decision-theory rather than of truth-theory. Let us look at that notion very carefully.
James defines an ‘option’ as a decision between two hypotheses. A ‘genuine option’ is an umbrella-notion that embraces three different sorts of decision-situations: Only if the decisions involved in it are ‘live’ rather than ‘dead’, ‘forced’ rather than ‘avoidable’ and ‘momentous’ rather than ‘trivial’, an option is a genuine one. Let us look at those three distinctions in turn. 
- The distinction between live and dead. 
A live hypothesis is one ‘which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed’​[19]​. For example, belief in the Mahdi is not a live option for a Westerner, whereas it can be that for an Arab. Even if this Arab is not a follower of the Mahdi, this belief is for him ‘among the mind’s possibilities’​[20]​. The criterion for liveliness is ‘willingness to act’, whereas the ‘maximum of liveliness…means willingness to act irrevocably’​[21]​. 
- The distinction between forced and avoidable.
A forced option is one in which you have no other choice but to choose one way or the other - tertium non datur. Dilemmas based on a logical disjunction are of this kind, you have no possibility of not choosing. If, however, you do have the possibility of not choosing, an option is avoidable. An example of an avoidable option is ‘either love me or hate me’. Here you can remain indifferent to me, thereby avoiding the necessity to choose between the alternatives. An example of a forced option is ‘either accept this truth or go without it’​[22]​. In this case, you are forced to make a decision.
- The distinction between momentous and trivial. 
An example of a momentous option is being invited to join Dr. Nansen’s North Pole expedition. It is a unique opportunity that may never come again and not taking it amounts to definitely missing the rewards that possibily come with it. A trivial option, however, is one in which the opportunity is not unique, when the stakes are insignificant, or the decision is reversible​[23]​. 
With these distinctions in hand, James defines an option that is forced, living and momentous as a ‘genuine option’. 
As will become clear below, James’ emphasis on genuine options functions as a restraint on the use of the justificatory strategy employed in TWTB. He argues that the strategy employed in justifiying religious belief is not open to just any sort of belief but works only in case genuine options are at stake. Since the religious beliefs he has in mind are genuine options, this particular strategy works in this case but not in others. In short, within the overall strategy of the argument, invoking the notion of a genuine option has the function to exclude an arbitrary usage of the justificatory strategy implied in TWTB. 

4. Religion as a genuine option

Within the argumentative structure of TWTB, the distinction between forced and avoidable options serves as a springboard for taking up the religious issue again. James concedes that in natural scientific affairs a decision between two options can often be avoided, say, if it is about the theory of Röntgen rays​[24]​. Not so in religion. In the case of certain religious beliefs, we are confronted with a forced option. But before fleshing out that claim, James provides a ‘definition’, or, rather, a characterization of ‘religion’ that we should consider first. 
According to James, religion ‘…says that the best things are the more eternal things,…the things in the universe that throw the last stone…and say the final word…’ as well as ‘…that we are better off…if we believe her first affirmation to be true’​[25]​. 
With this characterization in hand, James can answer the above question as to whether a decision can be avoided in religious affairs. His answer is ‘No’. ‘We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as we positively chose to disbelieve’​[26]​. Given what is at stake in religion, the option between believing and unbelieving is a forced option in the sense defined above. It is not possible to avoid the issue and walk away from it (as it is in the Röntgen case). Walking away from it would be tantamount to unbelief. ‘It is as if a man should hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him because he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel after he brought her home. Would he not cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married someone else?’​[27]​ Given that the decision on religion is a forced option, walking away neutrally from it is impossible. This amounts to unbelief. 
Pursuing the discussion of religion, James invokes the distinction between trivial and momentous: Religion is not a trivial but a momentous option. This is a straightforward corollary of the characterization of religion provided above. If we are better off believing that it is true that religion ‘says the final word’, it cannot but be a momentous option. ‘We are supposed to gain…by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital good’​[28]​.

5. The crucial ingredients of TWTB in a nutshell 

From his considerations thus far, James proceeds to an indirect justification of religious belief. He does so by criticizing what he now calls scepticism, i.e. the evidentialist prohibition to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. To that end, he uses the following, much-qouted words. 

‘Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a particular kind of risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of error - that is your faith-vetoer’s exact position…To preach scepticism to us as a duty until “sufficient evidence” for religion be found, is tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion laying down its law. And by what, forsooth, is the supreme wisdom of this passion warranted? Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear?’​[29]​ 

Here you have most of the ingredients of James’ famous argument in a nutshell: 
- The evidentialist critic of religious belief is betraying himself when thinking that with his refusal to make a decision on the question of religious belief he can really avoid the issue. In truth, he has taken sides already, viz. for the option of unbelief. Having decided that way he, intentionally or not, has implicitly decided to accept the risks that come with such a decision, chiefly among them the risk of losing truth.
- He is also betraying himself when thinking that he has a right to occupy the moral high grounds by not relying on passion or the like. In truth, he is relying on passion in the same way as his religious opponent is. It is just a different kind of passion, viz. a passionate fear to be mistaken. 
- Finally, there is no reason to think that the passion based upon the fear of being mistaken is in any way superior to the passionate hope that religious belief may be right. Thinking differently is simply an act of intellectual hegemony, ‘intellect with one passion laying down its laws’, as James criticizes it (see above). 


III The function of the notion of a genuine option within James’ argument and Hick’s misunderstanding of it

1. James’ argument presupposes that religious claims are live, forced and/or momentous and that the evidence for and against them is roughly equal 

As indicated above, invoking the notion of a genuine option​[30]​ serves as an instrument to hold in check an arbitrary usage of the justificatory strategy envisaged in James’ argument. Only in as far as a decision is a genuine option in the sense specified, the justificatory strategy implied is applicable. Only if a decision is truly forced, momentous and/or live, reference to ‘the hope that it [religious belief, D.-M. G.) may be true’​[31]​ is legitimate. It is only if an option is e.g. a forced one and we cannot avoid the necessity to decide either way, that we are entitled to reject the evidentialist ideal. If, however, it is not a forced option, it may be wiser to wait until sufficient evidence is found. In short, only if the requirements laid down by the notion of a genuine option are met, we are justified in believing in the sense of hoping that a religious claim is true. In other cases, we are not justified. Thus, the justificatory strategy implied in James’ argument works in the case of certain religious claims (and related cases) but is not a blank check for invoking hope in the place of evidence as a general rule. 
There is one further presupposition implied in this line of argument that James does not spell out explicitly but which is crucial for appreciating its success. This argument makes sense only if the evidence for and against a given religious claim is equal or roughly equal. If, however, the evidence is overwhelming one way or the other, the justificatory strategy implied in James’ argument does not apply. As indicated, James does not explicitly mention this requirement, yet, presupposes it clearly. Let us try to unearth it as a presupposition of another line of thought implied in James’ article. 
I think of the following line: James contends that he is adressing the ‘saving remnant’​[32]​ in his lecture. By that he means philosophers who do not exclude the possibility of religion being true on a priori grounds. Thus, he is adressing an audience which presupposes that there is no overwhelming evidence that religious claims are mistaken. The reason for that restriction is precisely that the justificatory strategy James implies makes sense only to people who do not exclude religion on a priori grunds. If, however, you would suppose that there is overwhelming evidence that religious beliefs are mistaken, you would not have to resort to such complex decision-theoretical considerations, say, regarding genuine options, but could straightforwardly proceed to falsify religious claims. 
To put the matter in the above nomenclature: Only in cases in which we are ‘intellectually’ uncertain, we are entitled to rely on non-intellectual resources, such as will or passion, for the purposes of justifying claims such as religious ones. In cases, however, in which we are ‘intellectually’ certain, i.e. in which we have overwhelming evidence either way, we do not need to resort to non-intellectual resources but possess more straightforward means of adjudicating the claims under consideration. In short, then, the justificatory strategy implied in TWTB-argument presupposes the absence of overwhelming evidence that religion is true or false - a presupposition, we may add, that did not escape James. 
That TWTB-argument presupposes that there is no overwhelming evidence for or against religion is important for judging its merits. James’ critics frequently overlook it when they charge that he is licensing wishful thinking, intellectual laziness and the like. They think that he wants to substitute will or passion for evidence. But in this article, this is clearly not his intention. He does not suggest that non-intellectual resources, such as will or passion, could substitute intellectual ones, the search for evidence, as a general rule. Rather, he suggests that we are justified in looking for non-intellectual resources in cases in which our intellectual resources are exhausted and in which we are confronted with genuine options, i.e., in which we cannot afford to walk away from an issue but have to make a decision. In summary, our right​[33]​ to invoke the justificatory strategy implied in ‘the Will to Believe’  is not a blank check for all sorts of irrationalisms but works only in case certain requirements are met: A decision must be live, forced and/or momentous and the evidence for and against a belief must be roughly equal. Those requirements must be met for us to legitimately invoke the justificatory strategy implied in TWTB. 
However, if those requirements are met, then there is no reason to give priority to the sceptical or evidentialist rule over the ‘rule of hope’, to say things in Jamesian parlance. On the contrary, under those circumstances, it would be imprudent or even irrational to refrain from believing a claim unless sufficient evidence for it can be found. For those religious claims that meet both requirements, i.e. which are live, forced and/or momentous and the evidence for and against them is roughly equal, the sceptical rule does not apply. That being the case, the evidentialist does not occupy the high-grounds concerning the ethics of belief-acquisition when playing off his sceptical principle against religious belief. On the contrary, the principle to refrain from hoping religious claims to be true for evidentialist reasons is imprudent or irrational in case of religious beliefs meeting both requirements.
 
2. Hick’s misconstrual of the function of the distinction between live and dead 

James has been seriously criticized for utilizing his notion of a genuine 
option, i.e. the distinctions between live and dead, forced and avoidable and momentous and trivial. I think, however, that many critics misunderstand its function. Let us look at an example of such a misunderstanding which targets one of those distinctions, viz. the distinction between live and dead. I have John Hick’s criticism in mind to which I will turn now. 
Referring to James’ above mentioned example that belief in the Mahdi is a live option for an Arab but not for a Westerner (see II.3), Hick holds that this suggestion is tantamount to saying that a religious claim does not 

‘…conform to the assumptions presently controlling his [James’, D.-M.G.] thinking. However, the fact that it was not a live option for James is an accidental circumstance that cannot affect the truth or falsity of the Mahdi’s assertion. An idea might be true, although it did not presently appeal to William James; but if the idea were true, James would never come to know it by his method, a method that could result only in everyone’s becoming more firmly entrenched in his or her prejudices. A procedure having this effect can hardly claim to be designed for the discovery of truth. It amounts to an encouragment to us all to believe, at our own risk, whatever we like. However, if our aim is to believe what is true, and not necessariliy what we like, James’ universal permissiveness will not help us’​[34]​.

But Hick misunderstands the function of the distinction between ‘live’ and ‘dead’ hypotheses. They are not devices or procedures ‘designed for the discovery of truth’, as he thinks. They cannot be for the simple reason that holding that something is ‘live’ respectively ‘dead’ for us and not for other people makes the liveliness-criterion relative to a certain group and whatever background assumptions it presupposes. And relative criteria cannot be translated into considerations concerning truth, provided that truth is a non-relative predicate - and James was smart enough to have realized that himself​[35]​. 
What function does this distinction then have for James? For him, this distinction has the function to provide us with a legitimation to neglect that which is too remote to consider seriously. He suggests that we are epistemically justified in neglecting ‘dead’ hypotheses. In other words, this distinction is geared towards regulating the ‘ethics of belief-acquisition’ rather than the acquisition of knowledge proper. 
Contrary to what Hick implies, James is concerned here with questions of epistemic justifiability rather than with questions of truth proper. He is not arguing that that which is ‘dead’ for us does by necessity not exist. The distinction between ‘live’ and ‘dead’ does not tell us which truth claims are veridical and which aren’t. This distinction is simply a device which makes thinking more efficient and frees us from the necessity to consider each and every possibility, no matter how remote. It helps us to go on with our lifes in the midst of countless truth claims or belief alternatives, religious or otherwise, and to focus on that which is potentially important or ‘live’ to us.

3. James’ distinction between live and dead and Rorty’s principle of ethnocentrism 
You may retort now that this is all well and good, but that James did not delve into considerations regarding truth is precisely his weakness. Because, after all, what is the use of criteria such as liveliness that answer to questions of justifiability, thus, epistemic questions, but are silent with regard to questions of truth proper, thus ontological ones? 
Let me respond in two steps, first, on a theoretical level, second on a more practical one. First, I think that there are good reasons to not close the difference between epistemology and ontology prematurely. More precisely speaking, justifiability and truth should be kept distinct. That which is justifiable is not necessarily that which is true in the proper sense of the word. It could be that that which is justified under certain circumstances will not turn out to be true​[36]​ and, vice versa, that that which is unjustified under certain circumstances may nevertheless turn out to be true under changed research circumstances​[37]​. In short, justification is not tantamount to truth. And under our current intellectual parameters, characterized by the fact that the notion of truth has come under fire (from postmodernist and related sides), we are wise to salvage the notion of justification and make it immune to from whatever attacks hit the notion of truth​[38]​. 
Second, the more practical answer. I think that criteria of the sort that James suggests are indeed valuable in our current intellectual situation. This situation I take to be characterized by two features, viz. an excess of world views, all claiming to be true, and the demise of the modernist confidence to possess legitimatory resources robust enough to single out one of them as being true, all things considered. In other words, our current situation is characterized by a certain amount of relativity. Given such a relativity, a device that provides us with prima facie resources to legitimately neglect that which is too remote to consider seriously is helpful. It provides us with orientation in an otherwise chaotic universe and makes our thinking more efficient. For example, the world view of the Australian aboriginals is too remote for our Western ways of thinking to be a ‘live option’ for us. And being too remote in this sense is a sufficient prima facie justification for neglecting to consider it as an existentially relevant option.
Note, however, the qualification that is implied in speaking of being prima facie justified in neglecting the Austalian aboriginals world view as an ‘existentially relevant’ option. By an ‘existentially relevant’ option I mean one according to which we conduct our lifes, interpret our fate according to whatever scheme it provides, get consolation from the deities it presupposes etc. ‘Existentially relevant’ is thus opposed to ‘purely historically relevant’ or something of that sort. In short, since it is not a ‘live’ option in the existentalist sense specified​[39]​, we are prima facie justified in neglecting the Australian aboriginal world view as an option according to which we conduct our lives etc. 
At this point, an interesting resemblance between pragmatism and neo-pragmatism surfaces: Interpreted in this fashion, James’ distinction between ‘live and dead’ resembles conceptually Richard Rorty’s principle of ethnocentrism, or, rather, anti-anti-ethnocentrism. (In a reasonable interpretation) the latter also provides a legitimation for neglecting that which is too remote to our own ‘ethnos’​[40]​. That is to say, both devices are geared towards justifying epistemically the neglect to consider seriously remote truth claims.
As much as I agree with utilizing criteria such as ‘liveliness’ or ethnocentrism, there are two provisions to it: First, we have to resist the temptation to translate them into considerations concerning truth proper. That the world view of the Australian aboriginals is ‘dead’ for us does not per se imply that it is false. The judgment that it is too remote is an epistemic point, not an ontological one. It answers the question as to whether we have an epistemic duty to consider it seriously, given that our time and our energy are limited. But it does not answer the question as to whether it is true. This is for the simple reason that it is based upon the world view we currently happen to hold. But in the absence of ‘objective’ criteria to single out our world view as being the only true one, the possibility that the Australian aboriginal world view will turn out to be true and ours false cannot be definitely ruled out.
Second, this acknowledgment entails certain moral consequences. One of them is that we should utilize criteria such as liveliness or Rorty’s ethnocentrism-principle in a sensitive fashion (which Rorty does not always do). That is, they should not be put in the service of a cynical outlook, say, to legitimate despise of other, non-Western cultures. And, given that we can never definitely rule out the possibility that what we consider to be dead (in James’ sense) is true, we must get used to a certain sort of openness of the mind. Relying on criteria such as ‘liveliness’ or Rorty’s ethnocentrism principle and distinguishing them from truth-related concerns must go hand in hand with an attitude that does not foreclose certain options for good.  
In summary, utilizing the distinction between live and dead in James’s sense justifies us in neglecting e.g. the world view of the Australian aboriginals as an existentially relevant option. It is simply too remote for us to consider seriously as an existentially relevant option at this point. We can look at it in non-existentially relevant terms, e.g. find it amusing, a source of learning on the difference of alien people’s beliefs or whatever. But we are epistemically justified in neglecting it as a ‘live’ option in the existentialist sense specified. 


IV Evaluating the apologetic achievements of the suggested interpretation of James’ argument 

1. The advantage of a decision-theoretical interpretation of TWTB over a truth-theoretical one

In his influential book on James, Richard Gale distinguishes between the case of ‘believing an epistemically undecidable proposition’ and ‘adopting it as a working hypothesis’​[41]​. Gale contends that James was ‘vacillating back and forth between the belief and working-hypothesis versions of his [TWTB, D.-M. G.] doctrine’​[42]​. Gale himself pursues the first option rather than the second one because he regards it to be more interesting. 
If I understand it correctly, Gale’s distinction comes down to something similar to what I distinguished above under the nomenclature truth theory versus decision theory. The argument of TWTB can be interpreted either to answer truth-theoretical problems in that will and passion are taken to justify us in holding religious claims to be true, provided certain provisions are met. Or, else, it can be taken to answer decision-theroretical questions in that will or passion are taken to entitle us to decide in favor of religious beliefs​[43]​, provided that those provisons are met, viz. that the evidence is not overwhelming either way, it is a genuine option etc.
From a purely philosophical point of view, as Gale and many of his fellow-interpreters presuppose, interpreting TWTB in truth theoretical terms may indeed be more interesting than to interpret it in decision-theoretical ones. After all, it implies strong revisionary consequences. It implies the possibility that the will or passion can legitimately influence what we hold to be true. Yet, by the same token, it is an extremely counterintuitive interpretation since it makes the notion of truth as ‘irrational’ as will and passion are. One can easily see why people like Russell jump on it. 
The problem with such an interpretation is that it requires an extremely strenuous theoretical apparatus that allows to translate non-epistemic justifications into epistemic ones proper.​[44]​ Non-epistemic justifications, relying on non-epistemic notions, such as will, passion, or whatever are logically weaker than properly epistemic ones, i.e. truth-relevant ones. A claim, p, being non-epistemically justified is not yet by the same token epistemically justified, i.e., p can still turn out to be false. In order to translate p as being non-epistemically justified into a stronger, epistemic claim, you need an apparatus that allows you to bridge the gap between non-epistemic justifications and epistemic ones. 
Proposing such an apparatus, however, will inevitably take you on the route to hard-nosed pragmatism or comparably radical doctrines, say, to the ‘truth as expediency’-doctrine (see above, II.1). It thus has the disadvantage of being plausible only to a very limited circle of followers, viz. to hard-nosed pragmatists and their friends. Therefore, whatever victories can be gained from the TWTB-argument for apologetic purposes will be plausible to hard-nosed pragmatist circles only. From an apologetic point of view being interested in reaching out to the greatest possible audience, this a priori limitation of the argument is a decisive disadvantage. 
Thus, I come down on the side of decision-theory. I interpret James as providing us with a legitimation to decide in favor of religious belief, rb, via the will or passion in spite of the fact that we do not have enough (‘intellectual’) evidence to hold rb to be true. To put the matter differently: His argument is that we are entitled to opt for rb in the absence of convincing evidence that rb is true or false, provided that rb is or can be reconstructed as being conceptually similar to ‘genuine options’, i.e., we cannot afford to remain indecisive on it. 
I think that certain religious claims can easily meet both provisons. Take, for example, religious claims resembling early Barth’s ‘totaliter aliter’ and the notions built around it. Given such claims, it is hardly a surprise that there is not enough (intellectual) evidence available on them and will never be (as long as we are in via). And take e.g. the Johannine ‘present eschatology’ according to which you have to decide here and now for or against faith, viz. in the face of Jesus the Christ - tertium non datur. The relevant features of claims of this sort resemble the features implied in the notion of ‘genuine options’. More precisely speaking, they are ‘forced options’ according to which it is impossible to remain neutral. And yet other religious claims meeting both provisions are conceivable. 
My point is the following. If the above argument cuts ice, as I think it does, and there are religious claims which meet both provisions, as I think there are, then we have an argument at hand that can justify us in believing in those claims via will or passion. I will flesh out the implications of that claim in IV.3 and IV.4.
  
2. Textimmanent reasons why TWTB should be interpreted as answering decision-theoretical rather than truth-theoretical questions

If we read TWTB carefully, it can hardly be doubted that James has decision-theoretical rather than truth-theoretical problems in mind. At least three reasons can be named for that. 
First of all, James’ considerations on the notion of a genuine option hint in a decision-theoretical direction (see above, II.3). For example, the notion of forced options has the function of demonstrating that, in certain cases, we cannot walk away from the necessity to decide. But it is not meant to provide a procedure for finding out what is true and what is not. In short, it answers decision-theoretical problems rather than truth-theoretical ones. Furthermore, we have seen above (III.2) that the distinction between live and dead is not supposed to function in truth-relevant ways either. 
Second, over and again, James uses terms in TWTB that belong to the decision-theoretical realm rather than to the truth-theoretical one. For example, he regards religious claims to be hypothetical ones when speaking of ‘religious hypotheses’. Furthermore, he uses words belonging to the prudential realm rather than to the truth-theoretical realm, viz. ‘better’, ‘wiser’ etc., when weighing the alternative between ‘yielding to our fear of its [the religious hypothesis, D.-M. G.] being error’ and ‘yielding to our hope that it may be true​[45]​. That shows again that those contentions belong into the decision-theroretical realm rather than into the truth-theoretical one.
Third, many of the examples James uses in TWTB point also in a decision-theoretical rather than a truth-theoretical direction. Take the above mentioned example of the man waiting indefinitely before proposing marriage to a woman because he is not perfectly sure that she will turn out to be an angel. The point James tries to raise here is not so much that, as a matter of fact, she will or will not turn out to be an angel but, rather, that this man has made a decision already. What the truth is, as to whether she will turn out to be an angel or not, remains as undecidable as ever. But James’ point is that this man’s indecisiveness has the same result as believing that she will not turn out to be an angel. That is the point of his rhetorical question: ‘Would he not cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married someone else?’​[46]​ Not deciding on an issue can be tantamount to having decided already in certain circumstances. But that point is a decision-theoretical one rather than a truth-theoretical one. 
Now, my point is not that all of James’ examples in ‘The Will to Believe’ point in a decision-theroretical rather than a truth-theoretical direction. You can find all sorts of examples in this loosely woven article, admittedly also examples that point in a truth-theoretical direction. For example, James mentions cases in which the will helping to believe p to be true can contribute to p’s being actually true​[47]​. Those cases are a special subclass of truth-relevant examples.
Thus, the examples provided in TWTB point in two different directions, a truth-theoretical one and a decision-theoretical one. The reason that I favor the latter is not only that I think that the decision-theoretical concern dominates the argument​[48]​ but also that it is better suited for the purposes of defending robust religious claims - my apologetic concern here. In other words, restricting TWTB-argument to cases in which believing p to be true can contribute to p’s being actually true would yield results too meager for my purposes here. 
Let me explain. Contending that a religious proposition could be made true by believing it is largely irrelevant for the purposes of defending robust religious or theological claims. Those claims, e.g. robust Christian claims, imply that the truth of their content is largely independent of human co-operation. According to a robust Christian world view, a religious claim is not being made true by the fact that Christians believe in it. A claim such as that God has created this world with a certain purpose in mind is not made true by Christians believing in it but is largely independent of human cooperation - rather, it is true because of, say, God’s ontological characteristics and the way he relates to this world in his triune action. 
Thus, for the apologetic purposes intended here, we can disregard the line of thought in TWTB according to which faith in a fact can help create that fact. I will concentrate instead on the other line of thought in TWTB, viz. James’ contributions to decision-theory. In both of the final sections, I will sketch in what sense interpreting TWTB in decision-theoretical terms provides an interesting potential for apologetic purposes.
 
3. TWTB’s apologetic achievements

It has been contended that James’ argument ‘…is not intended to convince an atheist that she would be better off believing in God. Rather, it is intended to convince someone already inclined to believe in God that there is nothing wrong with such a belief in spite of its lack of conclusive evidence for it’​[49]​. That being the case, TWTB is conceptually equivalent to the ontological argument for the existence of God. At least, in a reasonable re-interpretation, the ontological argument is not so much meant to convince the unbeliever​[50]​ but to convince the believer that there is nothing wrong with her belief. And so it is with James: He succeeds in demonstrating that if we believe and if this belief is generated via the will or passion, then this is not necessarily epistemically flawed. 
Obviously, invoking will or passion in the case of insufficient evidence does not necessarily justify holding religious beliefs. In principle, our passion or will could also lead us into the opposite direction, viz. to reject it. The likelihood of that possibility depends on the sort of religious claims at stake. With regard to certain claims, I do not regard it to be very high. Nevertheless, since it is theoretically possible, we should rephrase the argument and contend that what TWTB achieves is to open the possibility to justify religious belief via will or passion in the case of insufficient evidence, provided certain provisions are met. 
What is the upshot of this contention for apologetic purposes? It shows that TWTB-argument is successful in undermining the claim that the only grounds on which religious questions can be settled in a reasonable fashion are evidentialist or intellectual grounds. It makes clear that there are other grounds on which religious questions can be answered. And, most importantly, invoking non-intellectual grounds can be a perfectly legitimate move - e.g. if our intellectualist resources are exhausted and we are confronted with a genuine option. In short, James’ argument opens the possibility of legitimately invoking non-intellectualist grounds for answering religious questions. 
There are two advantages to such a move. First, it is very much in line with the actual practice of belief-acquisition in religious matters. As far as I can see, intellectual or cognitive reasons play only a limited role when it comes to acquiring, losing or changing one’s religious beliefs. But non-intellectual factors play a decisive role in that, as research into the reasons for religious conversions makes abundantly clear. 
More important for our present apologetic purposes, however, is that TWTB-argument relegates belief-questions to a domain where their chances of being answered positively are much better than in the purely intellectual domain. Invoking the role of emotions (passion) or the will and ascribing a legitimate function to them when it comes to judging religious beliefs significantly enhances the latter’s chances of being evaluated positively. Since the intellectual domain is to a good extent in the hands of the Russellians, Cliffordians and other evidentialist despisers of religion, undercutting this domain’s pretentions to be the only legitimate battle grounds for judging religious claims significantly enhances the latter’s chances of being taken seriously. 

4. Putting TWTB’s apologetic achievements in a historical perspective
In order to appreciate the achievments of TWTB in a more systematic fashion, we should position it in a historical frame of reference. I will do that briefly in the final section. Doing that and pitting it against its proper ‘polemical partner’ will reveal  that it is not only the antidote to evidentialism but also to the 19th century criticism of religion, such as Feuerbach’s. 
In the decision-theoretical interpretation provided, TWTB-argument does not contribute to the discussion as to whether religious claims are true or not. That is to say, the argument does not have the same function as the classical arguments for the existence of God have, especially the cosmological and the teleological argument. Its point is not to show that religious claims, such as the one that God exists, are true. For the same reason, its proper polemical partner is not atheism proper, say, of Kai Nielsen’s or J.L Mackie’s sort​[51]​. As indicated above, interpreting the argument as making truth claims regarding religion makes it highly implausible - at most, hard-nosed pragmatists can follow it - and makes it vulnerable to severe criticism. 
Rather than contributing to the question as to whether religious claims are true, TWTB contributes to the question as to whether we have a right to decide in their favor. Put differently, in the interpretation provided, TWTB answers the question as to whether we are entitled​[52]​ to hold them. Before proceeding with that argument, however, let me  briefly sketch the difference between arguments concerning the truth of religious claims and those concerning the entitlement to them. 
The basic difference is that truth-relevant arguments are geared towards the objective side of the act of faith. They answer the question as to whether the content of faith can legitimately be claimed to be true. Questions of entitlement, however, are geared towards the subjective side of the act of faith. They answer the question as to whether the subject is within her epistemic rights in believing. Contributors to this round of discussion are, arguing for the subject’s right to hold religious beliefs, e.g. Alvin Plantinga and, arguing against it, much of the 19th century criticism of religion, e.g. Feuerbach’s and Freud’s, as well as the above named evidentialist critique of religion. 
In the interpretation provided, TWTB contributes to the latter discussion. Its upshot is that, under certain circumstances, the subject is entitled to opt for religious belief in the absence of convincing evidence that this belief is true or false, provided that it is or can be reconstructed as being conceptually similar to ‘genuine options’. Thus, its proper polemical partners are the philosophers denying the subject a right to believe. 
It is my contention that TWTB succeeds in refuting those philosophers. It shows convincingly that the evidentialist critic of religion is mistaken when insisting on his principle that we always need to have enough (intellectual) evidence in hand before making a decision and that, in the absence of it, we should refrain from believing in religion. James succeeds in showing that there are certain occasions on which this principle does not apply - genuine options​[53]​ - and that, insofar as religious claims are such occasions, this principle does not apply to them. If there is insufficient evidence available on a given case, c, and our intellectual resources are exhausted, it can be more rational, prudent, or even morally obligatory to rely on non-intellectual resources in order to come to a decision concerning c than to refrain from deciding on it. In so far as religious claims resemble c - which is not difficult to conceive (see above, IV.1) -, it can be more rational or prudent to decide on them on the basis of non-intellectual resources, such as will or passion, than to refrain from deciding on them, as the evidentialist suggests. In other words, there are certain occasions conceivable in which we are entitled to decide in favor of religion, even if there is not enough evidence available on it. Put differently, there are circumstances in which we are entirely within our epistemic rights to believe in religion. 
I do not have the space here to argue the case extensively but would, at least, like to hint at another implication of the argument as reconstructed above. It has the potential to undermine much of the force of the above named 19th criticism of religion.
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